MEMORANDUM
TO: Chief Negotiator for United States in the Bilateral Talks with North Korea
FROM: Heather Martino, Negotiation Expert at the U.S. Department of State
SUBJECT: Cultural factors to consider in bilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations
DATE: 05/08/2010
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the rest of the State Department are ecstatic that North Korea has decided to engage in direct bilateral negotiations with the United States, and as such must ensure that smooth talks transpire. The last 10 years of our relationship have been quite stormy, as the Bush Administration ?steered sharply away from any kind of deal nurtured by its predecessors.?[1] We at the State Department believe that Mrs. Clinton can and will fulfill the work begun by Madeline Albright, Rev. Billy Graham, and ex-president Jimmy Carter during the Clinton Administration. As the Chief Negotiator, not only are you responsible for being well versed in North Korea?s substantial nuclear weapons capability and its effect on peace and stability in the region; but more importantly, you must also understand why previous efforts at bilateral negotiations ultimately failed, for those who don?t know their history are doomed to repeat it. Cultural differences between the United States and North Korea have affected the dynamics of prior attempts at bilateral negotiations, which is why we feel it necessary that you are briefed on the high-context approach taken by North Koreans. For this reason, I will highlight the main points of cross-cultural negotiations through concrete examples and specific linguistic idioms that help to illustrate the value Koreans place on the setting, personal relationships, considerations of time, and saving face. In doing so, it is the current administration?s hope that you can overcome the long standing barriers of cross-culture negotiations and achieve solid progress on the issue of nuclear disarmament.
Before I begin, please know that it is not my intent to patronize you, and although this may seem rather arbitrary, it is important that you understand how culture conditions ?how negotiators perceive the world and respond to signals, what they say, and how they say it,? especially in high context Asian cultures.[2] First and foremost, you must understand that while culture is an intrinsic part of a negotiator?s approach, it is, in a sense, nonnegotiable.[3] We have had enough contact with the North Koreans over the past years to know that whether or not a deal is reached, their cultural negotiating style will remain the same.? For this reason, it is important for you to enter these bilateral negotiations with a thorough understanding of the cultural differences that exist between us, and how these cultural differences have and will continue to effect bilateral negotiations.
?High? or ?low? context approaches taken by participants heavily shape negotiations, and as such, must be understood to the fullest extent. As Americans, we are thought to take a low context approach, in which the focus is on getting to the bottom line within the boundaries of abstract rules, laws, and time constraints. In the United States, we negotiate through offers and counteroffers, all with the aim of arriving at a mutually acceptable deal. In many Asian cultures, however, the approach to negotiating is not so cut and dry. Instead, negotiation consists of sharing information and perspectives, thus developing a personal relationship. For high context cultures like North Korea, cultivating a relationship is essential to reaching an agreement. Whereas in the United States time in is often fixed and valuable, we have been conditioned to believe that time is money. While this logic dictates our cut and dry negotiation style, it may seem impersonal to foreigners. To many high context cultures, we appear as having little regard of ?cultural sensitivities and diplomatic niceties,? which are of utmost importance to high context cultures, like North Korea.[4]
In most Asian cultures, including the Koreas, the overall setting of negotiations and personal bonds between negotiators are regarded highly. In high context cultures, completing a task is more important than the amount of time it takes, and thus ?issues are revisited, points are reexamined, and interpretations are redefined.?[5] Journalist Karen Elliott House referred to this the North Korean approach as ?a theater of the absurd: Pyongyang promises, then procrastinates, then provokes, then pauses. After a long pause come new promises, and the cycle starts anew.?[6] While this pattern of ?drama and catastrophe? can be rather frustrating to negotiators who are accustomed to the typical linear process with a clear beginning, middle, and end, high context cultures value the deeper mutual understanding that can arise from a fluid process.[7] For this reason, I urge you to be patient when you enter bilateral negotiations, and welcome the development of new considerations that are likely to arise.
North Koreans value punuigi, or atmosphere and kibun, with translates to good feeling in negotiations. When these values are absent, they will resort to practicing kojip, which is loosely understood to mean stubbornness or unyieldingness. They will express this attitude of intransigence through ?brinksmanship, cries of wolf, demands for unilateral concessions, bluffs and threats, manufactured deadlines, and threats to walk away from the negotiations? with the aim of leveraging weakness.[8] Intrinsic to this Korean way of negotiating is the belief that ?saving face is as important as life itself,? which was told to an American visitor in Pyongyang.[9] Indeed, it has been observed in the past that Korean negotiators must show that they have ?done everything possible to extract the most possible concessions? from their negotiating counterparts, which Koreans refer to as kosaeng, or suffering.[10]
I understand that these concepts may seem rather alien and abstract to you, but I can assure you that many experts in the field of cross-cultural negotiations have observed the high-low context relationship between North Korea and the United States as the greatest impediment to successful negotiations in the 1990s and early 2000.? As I?m sure you are aware, unofficial contacts of Track II diplomacy in the 1990s led to diplomatic breakthroughs in the U.S.-DPRK relationship, which laid the groundwork for Track I negotiations.[11] Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright?s memoirs provide great historical insight into the interaction with Pyongyang during the Clinton Administration, and thus her main observations shall be articulated here.
Albright observed first-hand the value Koreans place on high-level personal contacts, in both official negotiations and formal meetings.[12] When the former Secretary of State first met DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam-Sun in Bangkok in July 2000, she expected their talk would last fifteen minutes. When this informal conversation lasted an hour, Albright understood that time constraints are of no bearing to the Koreans, and the more important objective lay in developing a personal relationship. Following the advice that ?to get diplomatic results with North Korea one had to take time and build a relationship? Albright visited Kim Il Sung?s mausoleum on her trip to Pyongyang in October 2000.[13] Kim Jong Il expressed gratitude for both her energy and symbolic act, as well as Clinton?s letter of condolence for his father?s death, and the humanitarian assistance the United States had given North Korea in recent years. At the urging of then-President Clinton to visit North Korea, Albright observed ?North Korea?s top-down decision making style didn?t fit well with our practice of trying to ?pre-cook? arrangements? before committing the President.?[14] ?
As you well know, Clinton was unable to visit Pyongyang and ?bring fruition to the negotiations conducted by Albright and others? due to his prioritization of another mediation effort in the Middle East during his final weeks in office.[15] While the issue of time constraints in our culture again serves as an impediment to negotiations, the notion of ?face? is an important aspect of high context cultures. Although the Clinton White House did invite Kim Jong Il to the U.S., he likely declined ?because the invitation came so late and could be seen as an affront to face.?[16] Furthermore, any form of relationship cultivated by Albright was severely hurt when her successor, Colin Powell, told the press that North Korea was ?a threat? the United States could not be na?ve about in March of 2001.[17] Powell underscored the diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK when he told reporters if ?there are suggestions that there are imminent
negotiations [between the United States and DPRK], this is not the case.?[18] Denying such a relationship was a major blow to Koreans, who were further agitated when Powell called the DPRK a ?despotic regime?[19]
For his part, then-President George W. Bush broke all ?personal ties and semblance of friendship between countries? when he cut off all talks with North Korea, expressing his ?disgust toward a regime that let its own people starve.?[20] In a culture so deeply concerned with ?face,? North Korea refused to confess any wrong doing or make concessions. ?But perhaps the greatest affront to face came when Bush formally assigned North Korea to the ?axis of evil? in 2002.[21] Repeated insults to the DPRK regime and its ?Dear Leader? reached their climax in August 2003, when Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton called Kim Jong Il a ?tyrannical rogue,? and the DPRK responded by demanding his exclusion from talks held later that month in Beijing and branding him ?human scum.?[22] These events set the tone for the relationship between the United States and North Korea for the duration of the Bush presidency. It is this tendency toward name calling that we wish to avoid, which is why it is necessary for you to practice the diplomatic niceties so valued by high context cultures.
By this point, you should have a thorough understanding of the cross-cultural barriers in negotiating with the North Koreans. Now it is necessary to dissect and apply each issue in terms of overcoming these barriers, which is why I have created a series of guidelines for you to follow. Your first task is to assemble a team of expert negotiators and translators to bring with you to the negotiation table. Since North Koreans usually negotiate in groups, they are ?masters at wearing opponents down.?[23] In addition, it is crucial that language barriers do not exist, as clear communication is essential to reaching an agreement. As the Chief Negotiator, you must plan ahead by bringing your own interpreters and an expert negotiating team, so as not to rush or overburden yourself during negotiations.????????
North Koreans know that their conception of time often frustrates many foreign negotiators, and thus they leverage pressure during the final minutes or seconds of negotiation. The North Korean cyclical way of negotiating will lead you on by constantly revisiting and reconsidering earlier points before informing you just prior to the scheduled end of negotiations that they cannot accept your terms.[24] This tactic often frustrates foreigners and puts tremendous pressure on them to make last minute concessions, so as not to go home empty-handed. So as to avoid this situation, do not let the Korean negotiators know when you are scheduled to leave, and remain calm when issues are reevaluated in spite of inward frustration. I am confident that if you follow this simple guideline, North Korean negotiators will not only appreciate your attention to cultural sensitivities and diplomatic niceties, but they will also respect your commitment to the negotiations. If you are confident in yourself, I believe that you can also adopt a similar brinkmanship with as much finesse as the Koreans. Engage in the same game by assuming seemingly irreconcilable positions, and then accept a compromise in the final moments of the negotiation.
Throughout the negotiation process, remain aware of your demeanor and the image you are portraying. Remember that what is being negotiated is just as important as how one negotiates, given the personal, emotional nature of relationships in Korea. Work to establish a level of trust and mutual friendship with the North Korean negotiators, as it is unlikely they will come to an agreement until they are comfortable with the people involved. While this may take an extraordinary amount of time and effort, I am confident that if you have a good support team and remain proactive throughout the duration of negotiations, your personal relationships will flourish.
Finally, I must reiterate the importance of remaining calm despite frustration at what many would consider talking in circles. The Koreans are high context people who are skilled in the art of exploiting even the slightest sign of impatience during negotiations. Given the group dynamics and communication barriers, the negotiation process is often long and drawn out even in the best of circumstances. Remember that the large number of people that must be satisfied with the details of any agreement is often met with strong caution because Koreans feel they cannot afford to make mistakes. [25] In the same fashion, utilize your expert negotiation team to your full advantage by briefing them on the cross-cultural differences that can affect the dynamic of this negotiation. I am confident that if you follow all the guidelines I have laid out for you, successful bilateral negotiations will pave the way for achievements in nuclear disarmament.
[1] Clemens, Walter C. (2005) ?Negotiating to Control Weapons of Mass Destruction in North Korea.? International Negotiation, Volume 10, Number 3. Pp. 453-486. (465)
[3]? Heine, Heinrich. (2005) ?Role of Culture in Cross-Border Negotiations.? Global Business Negotiators. Pp. 1-19. (2) < http://www.wadsworthmedia.com/marketing/sample_chapters/053872658X_2.PDF>
[4] Cohen, Raymond. (2002). Negotiating Across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World. Rev. ed.; Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.
[5] Snyder, Scott (1999). Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior.Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Pg. 43-44.
[6] House, Elliott Karen (1997). ?Let North Korea Collapse.? Wall Street Journal. February 21: A14.
[12] Albright, Madeleine (2003). Madam Secretary: A Memoir. Miramax, 2003. Pg. 459?472.
[23] De Mente, Boye Lafayette. ?Korean Etiquette & Ethics in Business.?? Asia Pacific Management Forum. October 2001. < http://www.apmforum.com/columns/boye46.htm>.
Source: http://heathermartinoresume.com/?p=87
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